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Abstract
In the past decade, network structures have penetrated nearly every
aspect of our lives. The detection of anomalous vertices in these net-
works has become increasingly important, such as in exposing computer
network intruders or identifying fake online reviews. In this study, we
present a novel unsupervised two-layered meta-classifier that can detect
irregular vertices in complex networks solely by using features extracted
from the network topology. Following the reasoning that a vertex with
many improbable links has a higher likelihood of being anomalous, we
employed our method on 10 networks of various scales, from a network
of several dozen students to online social networks with millions of users.
In every scenario, we were able to identify anomalous vertices with lower
false positive rates and higher AUCs compared to other prevalent meth-
ods. Moreover, we demonstrated that the presented algorithm is efficient
both in revealing fake users and in disclosing the most influential people
in social networks.
Project Links: I Video I Website I Data I Code
Keywords: Complex Networks; Anomaly Detection; Cyber Security; Link
Prediction; Social Networks; Machine Learning
1 Introduction
Complex networks are defined as systems in nature and society whose structure
is irregular, complex, and dynamically evolving in time. The can consist of
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thousands, millions, or even billions of vertices and edges [6]. These systems
occur in every part of our daily life [26, 17], including electrical power grids,
metabolic networks, food webs, the Internet, co-authorship networks and online
social networks [26, 23]. Analyzing the unique structures of such networks can
be revealing; for example, an analysis of network structures can indicate how
a virus will propagate most quickly in a computer network [7], or which vertex
malfunction in a power grid will affect more houses [28].
Many studies have shown that vertices which deviate from normal behavior
can offer important insights into a network [3, 9, 18, 24, 25]. For instance,
Fire et al. [18] observed that fake profiles and bots in social networks have a
higher probability than benign users of being connected to a greater number
of communities. Bolton et al. [9] showed that e-commerce fraudsters behave
differently from the expected norm.
In this study, we introduce a novel generic unsupervised learning algorithm
for the detection of anomalous vertices, utilizing a graph’s topology (see Figure
1). The algorithm consists of two main iterations. In the first iteration, we
create a link prediction classifier which is based only on the graph’s topology.
This classifier can predict the probability of an edge existing in the network with
high accuracy (see Section 3.1). In the second iteration, we generate a new set of
meta-features based on the features created by the link prediction classifier (see
Section 3.2). Then, we utilize these meta-features and construct an anomaly
detection classifier. Intuitively, the algorithm is based on the assumption that a
vertex having many edges with low probabilities of existing (improbable edges)
has a higher likelihood of being anomalous. As a case in point, the presented
algorithm was able to detect 89% of the outliers in a real world social graph
(see Section 6).
We evaluated our anomaly detection algorithm on 10 complex networks of
three types: fully simulated networks, real world networks with simulated anoma-
lous vertices, and real world networks with labeled anomalous vertices (see Sec-
tion 5 and Table 1). Our study results show that the proposed algorithm can
successfully detect malicious users in complex networks in general, and more
specifically, in online social networks. The presented algorithm succeeded in
detecting various anomalies with high accuracy with low false positive rates.
Moreover, we showed that this algorithm can find influential people in social
structures, indicating it could be applicable as a generic anomaly detection al-
gorithm in additional domains.
The principal contributions of this study are the following:
1. We demonstrate our successful incorporation of a link prediction technique
into an anomaly detection model which requires almost no prior knowledge
of the graph (see Section 3.1.2). For instance, our algorithm could detect
anomalies in semi-simulated networks with an average AUC of 0.99.
2. We present seven new network features that are good predictors for anomaly
detection (see Section 3.2).
3. We offer valuable resources for future research by making this study re-
producible; we have published all of its code and data online, including
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the real world datasets containing labeled fake profiles (see Section 9).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present an
overview of relevant studies. In Sections 3 and 4, we describe how we constructed
our algorithm and the datasets we used to evaluate it, respectively. Section 5
provides a description of the experiments we performed to evaluate the presented
method. In Section 6, we present our results.
2 Literature Overview
The detection of anomalies is extremely useful, because the discovery of irregu-
larities without any prior knowledge or help of an expert is a necessity in many
domains [4].
The analysis of graphical data has grown in popularity [16] over the past two
decades, and this has been accompanied by increasing quantities of research
on anomaly detection in complex networks. However, many insights remain to
be discovered, particularly in the structure-based method subgenre of anomaly
detection. One of the first studies that combined complex networks and anomaly
detection was conducted by Noble and Cook [24] in 2003. Noble and Cook’s
method was based on the concept that substructures reoccur in graphs, which
means anomalies are substructures that occur infrequently.
In 2005, Sun and Qu [27] proposed a method for detecting abnormal nodes
in bipartite graphs. They calculated normality scores (based on the neighbor-
hood relevance score), where nodes with a lower normality score had a higher
likelihood of being anomalous. In 2007, Eberlea and Holder [16] proposed a
mean of detecting fraud by discovering modifications, insertions, and deletions
in graphs. Unlike Noble and Cook, Eberlea and Holder looked for substructures
that while similar to normative substructures, are still different.
In 2010, Papadimitriou et al. [25] presented a method that can identify anoma-
lies in a web graph that may occur as a result of malfunctions. They proposed
identifying outliers by comparing the similarity scores of two consecutive graphs
against some threshold. In 2010, Akoglu et al. [3] proposed a feature-based
method to spot strange nodes in weighted graphs. In order to detect anoma-
lies, they defined a score that measures “distance to fitting line”, considering
Table 1: Social Network Datasets
Network Directed Vertices Links Date Labels
Academia Yes 200,169 1,389,063 2011 No
ArXiv No 34,546 421,578 2003 No
Class Yes 53 179 1881 Yes
DBLP No 1,665,850 13,504,952 2016 No
Flixster No 672,827 1,099,003 2012 No
Twitter Yes 5,384,160 16,011,443 2012 Yes
Yelp No 249,443 3,563,818 2016 No
3
nodes with the highest scores as outliers. In 2012, Fire et al. [18] proposed a
method for detecting fake profiles in online social networks based on anomalies
in a fake user’s social structure. They trained their classifier on simulation of a
fake profile that randomly sends friendship requests to other users in the net-
work. Recently, Hooi et al. [21] presented FRAUDAR, a method for detection
of “camouflaged” malicious accounts. FRAUDAR utilizes density-based metrics
in order to detect malicious accounts in bipartite networks.
In this work, we rely on a link prediction algorithm which is central to our
anomaly detection method. Link prediction is defined as the discovery of hidden
or future links in a given social network [22]. The link prediction problem was
first introduced by Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg [22] in 2003 when they stud-
ied co-authorship networks and tried to predict future collaborations between
researchers. They proved that future links can be predicted with reasonable
accuracy from network topology alone.
Cukierski et al. [14] proposed a method that is based on supervised machine
learning and uses 94 different features. They discovered that a Random Forest
classifier performed best out of all of the supervised machine learning methods
evaluated.
Fire et al. [19] analyzed which topological features are more computationally
efficient. They tested a total of 54 different features that were divided into five
subsets, using ten different datasets of online social networks. They discovered
that a smaller subset of features can be used to obtain results with relatively
high AUCs [19]. Later, Fire et al. demonstrated that in many cases the benefits
of using a large number of features is insignificant, and that by only using com-
putationally efficient features, it is possible to get highly accurate classifications
[19].
3 Methods
Studies conducted in the past several years indicate that malicious users typi-
cally present different behavioral patterns than benign users [18, 10, 12]. Moti-
vated by the difference between the observed behavioral patterns of fake profiles
and benign users, we developed a method to generate examples for our link
classifier. We aggregated the results from the link classifier for each vertex and
created an additional set of features (see Section 3.2). We then, used the second
set of features to build a meta-classifier that identifies anomalous vertices in the
graph.
3.1 Constructing a Link Prediction Classifier
As described in Section 2, in the last decade researchers have proposed various
methods for accurately predicting links in graphs [22, 14, 19, 5, 11]. In this
study, we constructed a topology-based link prediction classifier based on the
works of Fire et al. [19] and Cukierski et al. [14]. We extracted 19 different
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Figure 1: Algorithm overview. (A) The link prediction classifier is trained to
calculate the probability that an edge does not to exist in the graph. For exam-
ple, the classifier can predict that the probability of an edge between the two
green nodes not existing is 94%. (B) We utilize the link prediction classifier to
predict the probability of each edge not existing. (C) We calculated the for each
vertex the average probability that the vertex edges do not exist. (D) Vertices
that have the highest average probability (the red vertices) are inspected.
features,1 16 of which are used for directed graphs (all of the edge-based features
except for TransitiveFriends and AdamicAdarIndex are used for both directed
and undirected graphs) and eight are used for undirected graphs. Prior to
describing how the features were used, we provide the following definitions. Let
G := (V,E) be a graph where V is a set of the graph’s vertices and E is the set
of the graph’s edges. Let v ∈ V ; then Γ(v) is defined as the neighborhood of
vertex v, while Γin(v), Γout(v), and Γbi(v) are defined as the inbound, outbound,
and bidirectional set of neighbors, respectively.
3.1.1 Feature Extraction
• Total Friends is the number of distinct friends between two vertices v
and u.
TotalFriends(v, u) := |Γ(v) ∪ Γ(u)|
• Common Friends represents the number of common friends between
two vertices v and u.
CommonFriends(v, u) := |Γ(v) ∩ Γ(u)|
For a directed graph we define three variations of Common Friends:
CommonFriendsin(v, u) := |Γin(v)∩Γin(u)|, CommonFriendsout(v, u) :=
|Γout(v) ∩ Γout(u)|, and CommonFriendsbi(v, u) := |Γbi(v) ∩ Γbi(u)|.
1 In a large dataset, computing dozens of features can last several hours or even several days;
to avoid extremely long computations we used only computationally efficient features [19].
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• Jaccard’s Coefficient [14, 19, 22] measures similarity between two groups
of items.
JaccardsCoefficient(v, u) :=
|Γ(v) ∩ Γ(u)|
|Γ(v) ∪ Γ(u)|
• Preferential Attachment Score [22] is based on the idea that the rich
get richer in social networks.
PreferentialAttachment(v, u) := |Γ(v)| · |Γ(u)|
• Transitive Friends for a directed graph G calculates the number of tran-
sitive friends of vertices v and u.
TransitiveFriends(v, u) := |Γ(v)out| ∩ |Γin(u)|
• Opposite Direction Friends indicates whether reciprocal connections
exist between two vertices.
OppositeDirectionFriends(v, u) :=
{
1, if (u, v) ∈ E
0, otherwise
• Adamic-Adar Index [22] measures how strongly two vertices are related.
AdamicAdarIndex :=
∑
w∈Γ(u)∩Γ(v)
1
log |Γ(w)|
The kNN weight2 features are general neighborhood and similarity-based fea-
tures [14]. They are based on the principle that as the number of friends goes
up, the value of each individual friend decreases.
• Directed kNN Weights are defined by two notations. Let v, u ∈
V , where v edges weight will be win(v) :=
1√
1+|Γin(v)|
and wout(v) :=
1√
1+|Γout(v)|
, inbound and outbound, respectively. The weight of the con-
nection between v and u can be measured using eight combinations of
these weights: (a) kNNW1(v, u) := win(v)+win(u); (b) kNNW2(v, u) :=
win(v)+wout(u); (c) kNNW3(v, u) := wout(v)+win(u); (d) kNNW4(v, u) :=
wout(v)+wout(u); (e) kNNW5(v, u) := win(v)·win(u); (f) kNNW6(v, u) :=
win(v)·wout(u); (g) kNNW7(v, u) := wout(v)·win(u); and (h) kNNW8(v, u) :=
wout(v) · wout(u).
• Undirected kNN Weights are defined similarly, but only for the neigh-
bors. Let v, u ∈ V , where the weight of v edges’ will be w(v) := 1√
1+|Γ(v)|
and the weight of the connection between v and u will be measured by two
combinations: (a) kNNW9(v, u) := w(v)+w(u) and (b) kNNW10(v, u) :=
w(v) · w(u).
2 This not the standard kNN acronym, but a set of weight functions defined by Cukierski et
al. [14].
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3.1.2 Classifier Construction
Similar to Fire et al. [19], we trained the link classifier on the same number of
negative and positive examples which are existing edges and non-existing edges
respectively. The negative examples represent real users and were selected ran-
domly (degree distribution) from all of the existing edges in the graph. The
positive examples were selected as non-existing edges between two random ver-
tices which were sampled uniformly to represent the edges of a malicious user
in social network. After obtaining a set of positive (non-existing edges) and
negative (random edges) examples, for each entry we extracted all of the fea-
tures described in Sections 3.1.1. Finally, we used the Random Forest algo-
rithm to construct the link prediction algorithm for our training sets. We chose
the Random Forest algorithm because previous link prediction studies [14, 19]
demonstrated that, in most cases, it performs better than other classification
algorithms at predicting links.
3.2 Detecting Anomalous Vertices
After constructing a link prediction classifier for each graph, we utilized the
classifier to build an unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm. We used the
trained classifier to calculate (for all the edges of the inspected vertices) the clas-
sifier’s confidence that an edge does not exist. Using this metric we calculated
seven features that we used to identify anomalies.
input : Graph G, Number of nodes to sample N , Node label Label, Minimal
number of friends MinFriends
output: Edges of Selected Vertices
1 SelectedEdges← Set();
2 while N > 0 do
3 RandomVertex ← SampleNodes(G,1);
4 if RandomVertex = Label and |Γ(RandomVertex)| > MinFriends then
5 TempEdges← Set();
6 foreach Node u in Γ(RandomVertex) do
7 if |Γ(u)| > MinFriends then
8 TempEdges← TempEdges + (RandomVertex, u);
9 end
10 end
11 if |TempEdges| > MinFriends then
12 SelectedEdges← SelectedEdges + TempEdges;
13 N← N− 1;
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 return SelectedEdges;
Algorithm 1: Sampling vertices from a graph.
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3.2.1 Anomaly Detection Features
Let p(v, u) be the probability that an edge does not exist, where v, u ∈ V ,
(v, u) ∈ E, and EP (v) := {p(v, u)|u ∈ Γ(v) and u, v ∈ V } is the set of vertex v
edge probabilities not existing.
• Abnormality Vertex Probability is defined as the probability of a
vertex v to be anomalous, which is equal to the average probability of its
edges not existing.
P (v) :=
1
|Γ(v)|
∑
u∈Γ(v) p(v, u)
• Edges Probability STDV is the standard deviation of a set of vertex v
edges’ probability not existing.
EdgesProbabilitySTDV (v) := σ(EP (V ))
• Sum Edge Label is the number of vertex v edges’ that were labeled
as anomalous; in other words, this is the number of edges v with a p
higher than a defined threshold, which in this work was set to 0.8. The
goal of this feature is to detect cases where vertices have many anomalous
edges, most of which are only slightly above the threshold, resulting in a
relatively low P .
SumEdgeLabel(v) :=
∑
u∈Γ(v)EdgeLabel(v, u)
where we define the function EdgeLabel(v, u) as:
EdgeLabel(v, u) :=
{
0, if p(v, u) < threshold
1, otherwise
• Mean Predicted Link Label is the percent of v edges that are labeled
as anomalous.
MeanPredictedLinkLabel(v) :=
1
|Γ(v)|
∑
u∈Γ(v)EdgeLabel(v, u)
• Predicted Label STDV is the standard deviation of the classification
of v edges.
PredictedLabelSTDV (v) := σ({EdgeLabel(v, u)|u ∈ Γ(v), u, v ∈ V })
• Edges Probability Median is the median of set of vertex v edges’ prob-
ability of not existing. The advantage of median over mean is that it is
not as sensitive to unusually large or small values.
EdgesProbabilityMedian(v) := median(EP (V ))
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• Edge Count is the number of edges that vertex v has. An extremely low
value may indicate that the results for vertex v are statistically insignifi-
cant.
EdgeCount(v) := |Γ(v)|
We used the described features to rank all of the vertices by the different
features and manually examined the top and bottom vertices, which had the
highest and lowest likelihood of being anomalous.
3.2.2 Test Set Generation
First, we created the test set by sampling the edges of random vertices from
the graph. The sampling process works as described in Algorithm 1: The al-
gorithm starts by uniformly selecting one random vertex, RandomV ertex (line
3). Next, we check if it has more neighbors than the minimal amount required
(MinFriends). In addition, for labeled graphs we also check if RandomV ertex
has the desired label, in order to ensure that the test set has positive exam-
ples (line 4). Then, we select all of the RandomV ertex neighbors that also
have more than MinFriends neighbors. This constraint is used to ensure that
the neighbors of RandomV ertex also were crawled and that the link features
to be extracted are meaningful (lines 6-9). If RandomV ertex has more than
MinFriends neighbors that have more than MinFriends neighbors, then the
selected edges are added to the test set (lines 11-14).
The goal of these steps was to select only edges between nodes which were
likely fully crawled and had neighbors in the graph (i.e, have more thanMinFriends
neighbors, which we set at three, the minimal number of vertices where we have
a majority of edges of one of the class). Vertices that have a small number of
neighbors are less relevant, since there is not enough information to determine
their behavior [18]. The algorithm continued to run until it added N vertices to
the test set. In our experiments, we executed Algorithm 1 twice for each net-
work, the first time to extract positive samples and the second time to extract
negative samples. In both cases, we set MinFriends to three.
3.2.3 Training Set Generation
Later, we sampled the link prediction classifier training set that was described
in Section 3.1. The edge sampling for the link classifier worked as follows: Let
test-vertices be a set of all of the vertices that were selected by Algorithm 1,
and if (v, u) ∈ E is an edge, then (v, u) can be part of the link classifier training
set, if and only if, u, v /∈ test-vertices.
4 Social Network Datasets
Academia.edu3 is a social platform for academics to share and follow research.
3 https://www.academia.edu
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ArXiv4 is an ePrint service used in fields such as physics and computer
science. We used the ArXiv HEP-PH (high energy physics phenomenology)
citation graph that was released as part of the 2003 KDD Cup.5
Boys’ Friendship (Class Of 1880/81)6 is a dataset which contains the
friendship network of a German school class from 1880-81. The dataset itself was
generated by observing students, interviewing pupils and parents, and analyzing
school essays [20]. The dataset contains 12 outliers out of 53 students, which
Heidler et al. defined as students who did not fit perfectly into their predicted
position within the network structure. The data contains three types of outliers:
“repeaters,” who were four students who often led the games; “sweets giver,”
a student who bought his peers’ friendship with candies; and a specific group
of seven students who were psychologically or physically handicapped, or socio-
economically deprived.
DBLP7 is the online reference for bibliographic information on major com-
puter science publications. We used the DBLP dataset to build a co-authorship
network.8
Flixster9 is a social movie site which allows users to share movie reviews and
discover new movies.
Twitter10 is an undirected online social network where people publish short
messages and updates. Currently, Twitter has 310 million monthly active
users.11 According to recent reports, Twitter has a bot infestation problem
[2, 15]. We used a dedicated API crawler to obtain our dataset in 2014.12
Yelp13 is a web platform to help people find local businesses. In addition,
Yelp provides various social capabilities. In 2016, Yelp published a dataset
containing a social network of its users.14
5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated our algorithm on ten networks that categorized into three types
of datasets (fully synthetic dataset, real world dataset with injected anomalies,
and real world dataset with labeled anomalies). In addition, due to hardware
limitations, for each dataset we sampled a test set that contained 900 random
existing vertices and 100 anomalous vertices. The test set maintained the same
1:10 ratio between anomalous and normal vertices. To reduce the variance of the
results, we ran the algorithm 10 times on each dataset. The more evaluations we
performed, the smaller the variance in the results. We evaluated the algorithm
on the average result of these experiments. To measure the algorithm’s perfor-
mance, we used 10-fold cross-validation to measure the TPR, FPR, precision,
and AUC for all of the evaluations. In addition, we measured the algorithm’s
4 https://www.arxiv.com 5 https://snap.stanford.edu/data/cit-HepPh.html
6 https://github.com/gephi/gephi/wiki/Datasets 7 https://www.DBLP.com
8 http://DBLP.uni-trier.de/xml/DBLP.xml.gz 9 https://www.flixster.com
10 https://www.twitter.com 11 https://about.twitter.com/company 12 We lim-
ited the crawler to crawling a maximum of 1,000 friends and followers for every profile
(see Section 9). This limitation is due to the fact that Twitter accounts can have an
unlimited number of friends and followers, which in some cases can reach several million.
13 https://www.yelp.com 14 https://www.yelp.com/dataset_challenge
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precision at k (precision@k) for k := 10, 100, 200, and 500. Finally, we compared
our method’s performance to the Stranger algorithm [18] and to a random al-
gorithm in detecting anomalies. We only made the omparison on the real world
dataset since the training process of the Stranger algorithm is correlated with
the way we generate our synthetic data.
5.1 Simulation of Anomalous Vertices
Currently, there is a very limited number of publicly available datasets with
known anomalies, and manual labeling is a challenging task [4]. To deal with
these issues and evaluate the proposed anomaly detection algorithm on vari-
ous types of networks, we used simulated anomalous vertices (see Algorithm 2)
for different scenarios. Similar to previous studies [18, 10, 12], we generated
anomalous vertices by randomly connecting them to other vertices in the net-
work as follows. First, we inserted a new simulated vertex into the graph (line
2). Next, we generated NeighborsNumber, the number of edges to be created
for the simulated vertex (line 3). Then, we sampled random NeighborsNumber
vertices from the graph (line 4). Afterwards, we connected the newly inserted
vertex to the sampled random vertices (lines 5-7). The number of anomalous
vertices in each graph was set to 10%, which represents an estimation of the
percentage of fake vertices in an average social network [2, 1].
input : Graph G, having simulated vertex number N
output: Graph G with N simulated vertices
1 for i← 1 to N do
2 SimulatedVerticesNumber ← AddVertex(G,i,Fake);
3 NeighborsNumber ← Random(G.DegreeDistribution));
4 RandomVertices ← SampleVertices(G,NeighborsNumber);
5 foreach Vertex u in RandomVertices do
6 AddEdge(v,u);
7 end
8 end
Algorithm 2: Adding anomalous vertices to a graph.
5.2 Fully Simulated Network Evaluation
To generate a fully simulated complex network we used the Baraba´si-Albert
model (BA model) [8], which is a minimal’ model that can generate scale-free
networks. We believe it should give a good indication of the performance of
the method on various types of complex networks. The generated networks
were constructed according to the number of vertices and the average number
of edges of a real world network to make them as close as possible to actual
networks. First, we generated BA networks that were 90% of the size of the
real networks that are described in Section 4. Generating complex networks
using the BA model requires two parameters: the number of vertices to be
generated and the number of edges to be created for each vertex. We used the
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number of vertices and the average number of edges of the ArXiv, DBLP, and
Yelp datasets (see Table 1) to generate the simulated networks. Afterwards, we
inserted anomalous vertices for the remaining 10% (see Algorithm 2).
5.3 Semi-Simulated Network Evaluation
The second dataset type was a semi-simulated network, which is a real world
network with injected simulated anomalous vertices (see Algorithm 2). The
evaluation was conducted on the datasets of ArXiv, DBLP, Flixster, and Yelp
(see Table 1) with inserted anomalies.
5.4 Real World Network Evaluation
The third dataset type we tested our method on was a real world network with
labeled anomalous vertices. We evaluated the graphs of the Boys’ Friendship
(referreed to as Class) and Twitter datasets (see Table 1). The Twitter data, by
default, did not have any labels. To create labels that can be considered ground
truth, we crawled all of the profiles (without the edges) in the Twitter dataset,
approximately one year after the initial crawling took place. Similar to Hooi
et al. [21], we considered all of the accounts that Twitter operators decided to
block as a ground truth. The most common reasons for suspension are spam,
the account being hacked or compromised, and abusive tweets or behavior.15
As a result, we labeled all of the accounts which were suspended as malicious,
and we considered them to be anomalous vertices in the graph. In addition,
we filtered all of the verified accounts from the dataset. A verified account is
an account of public interest, primarily those of celebrities, politicians, etc.15
These were filtered because most of their connections do not represent regular
users, and many times they are managed by some kind of third party [13].
In the Class dataset, we observed that nearly all of the psychologically or
physically handicapped students, (all except one) did not have neighbors in the
graph. This left us with three groups of outliers: the four “repeaters,” the single
“sweets giver,” and two pupils who were socio-economically deprived. Due to
the small scale of the dataset, running the anomaly detection algorithm with
a small number of repetitions can result in high variance rates. Therefore, to
reduce the variance we ran our method 100 times on the dataset and calculated
the average of the features presented in Section 3.2. In addition, every execution
we tested contained only 10 vertices.
6 Results
First, we evaluated the method on fully simulated networks with simulated
anomalous vertices using a 10-fold cross-validation. As can be seen in Table 2,
for the three fully simulated networks, we obtained high AUCs and low FPRs.
Second, we evaluated the proposed method on semi-simulated graphs, i.e., real
15 https://support.twitter.com/articles/15790
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world networks with injected anomalous vertices. We can see that the algorithm
generated especially good results, with an average AUC of 0.99 and FPR of 0.021
(see Table 2). Third, we evaluated our algorithm on labeled real world data. The
Table 2: Machine Learning Results Using Fully Simulated Networks and Semi-
Simulated Networks with Simulated Anomalous Nodes
Network AUC TPR FPR Precision
Si
m
ul
at
io
n ArXiv 0.991 0.889 0.011 0.904
DBLP 0.997 0.935 0.006 0.993
Yelp 0.993 0.917 0.007 0.937
Se
m
i-S
im
ul
at
ed Academia 0.999 0.998 2.51·10−4 0.997
Arxiv 0.997 0.953 0.004 0.965
DBLP 0.997 0.940 0.005 0.995
Flixster 0.992 0.908 0.010 0.990
Yelp 0.996 0.941 0.005 0.958
first real world dataset was Twitter. The results showing the classifier precision
at k average value are presented in Figure 2. We can see that the precision at
10, 50, 100, 200, and 500 was 0.6, 0.4, 0.35, 0.26, and 0.142, respectively. The
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 5000.0
0.1
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n Stranger AlgorithmRandom Algorithm
LPAD
K
Figure 2: The blue, green and orange lines represent Twitter precision at K of
LPAD, Stranger, and random algorithm respectively.
second real world dataset was the Class network. We found that six out of the
seven students (precision@7=0.875) with the lowest MeanPredictedLinkLabel
were the ones that Heidler et al. [20] referred to as the “repeaters” or the socio-
economically deprived and defined as outliers (see Figure 3). Evaluating the
algorithm using 10-fold cross-validation and the OneR algorithm, where the
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“repeaters” and socio-economically deprived students were labeled as a positive
class, resulted in an AUC of 0.931, TPR of 0.91, and FPR of 0.15. In addition,
we discovered that our method detects anomalies much better than Strangers
[18] in the Class dataset (see Table 3). To determine which of the new features
we proposed in Section 3.2 have more influence, we analyzed their importance
using Weka’s information gain attribute selection algorithm. From the results
in Tables 4 and Table 5 we can see that for both simulated and semi-simulated
scenarios the most influential feature is AbnormalityV ertexProbability.
7 Discussion
Upon analyzing the results presented in Section 6, we can conclude that the
proposed anomaly detection algorithm fits well in the network security domain.
Our results demonstrate very low false positive rates, on average 0.006, in all
of the tested scenarios. In the security domain, a false positive is one of the
most important metrics; online operators try to avoid false positives to ensure
that legitimate users are not blocked. Similarly, many social network operators
prefer to sacrifice a true positive rather than have a relatively high false positive
rate [12].
In the fully simulated network cases, we can see that the simulation results are
correlated with the size of the networks. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, we
obtained better results for the larger datasets. More specifically, the simulated
network that was based on DBLP characteristics was the largest and had the
best TPR, while the ArXiv-based simulation was the smallest dataset and had
the lowest TPR.
In the Twitter case, we strongly believe there are substantial numbers of ma-
licious accounts that Twitter operators have not discovered [15]. These undis-
covered malicious users translate into high false positives rates. By manually
sampling the false positives, we discovered that many of these profiles are in-
active, and their tweets look like generated commercial content, whereas other
profiles largely retweeted content from other users. Because of the many unsus-
pended malicious accounts in Twitter [15], we believe our method would perform
better on a fully labeled dataset. Yet even with these issues, we think Twit-
ter is a good indicator of how well our method performs on real world data.
According to the Twitter results (see Figure 2), we were able to detect fake
Twitter profiles with precision at 100 of 35%; this performance is considerably
better than either Strangers or a random algorithm, which in this case resulted
in approximately 8.0% and 6.4% precision, respectively. One of the reasons we
Table 3: Comparison of the current method (LPAD) with Strangers [18] on the
Class dataset (see Section 4)
Method AUC TPR FPR Precision
LPAD16 0.910 0.889 0.150 0.964
Strangers 0.714 0.439 0.006 1.000
ZeroR 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.000
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believe our method’s performance in this case is much better than Stranger’s is
due to the data being incomplete. Stranger’s algorithm is based mainly on com-
munity features, which are more sensitive to incomplete data than edge-based
features.
The Class network results confirmed the previous research [20]. The re-
searchers described the “repeaters” as pupils who often led games and were
strong, lively, and energetic, especially outside of the classroom. They also
mentioned that socio-economic status exhibited a strong influence on popular-
ity. In their work the researchers verified that the four “repeaters” and the
“sweets giver” had a disproportionately high level of popularity. Our results
show that the four “repeaters” had the strongest friendship ties of all the other
pupils, which aligns with their findings. The “sweets giver,” who also had high
popularity, was just ranked in the middle, which also is reasonable, since some
boys who looked like his friends only wanted candies, not friendship.
Lastly, according to the overall results, we can clearly state that our method
can detect malicious profiles that act according to a random strategy. We sus-
pect, however, that the method would be less effective on malicious users that
have specific targets and strategies. We also found that it is more challenging
to detect malicious users on networks like Twitter, where most of the users have
some randomness in their behavior. Such properties are more common in undi-
rected networks where a user can follow anyone, without the need for the other
side’s consent.
Our results also indicate that the proposed method can be utilized outside
of the security domain. For instance, in a friendship graph, a vertex that has
many edges with high probabilities of existing is a marker of a central person
in the social group examined. Moreover, we believe that the presented method
could be used to detect hijacked profiles, when the hijacker starts to connect
randomly to other vertices in the network.
Table 4: InfoGain Values for Different Features for Semi-Simulated Networks
(darker color represents higher InfoGain)
Abnormality
Vertex
Probability
Probability
Median
Sum
Link
Label
Mean
Predicted
Link
Label
Probability
STDV
Predicted
Label
STDV
Edge
Count
Academia 0.47 0.47 0.37 0.39 0.29 0.1 0
Arxiv 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01
DBLP 0.34 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.23 0.15 0.04
Flixster 0.21 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.05
Yelp 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.06 0.06
Mean 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.2 0.05 0.03
STDV 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.05 0 .02
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Table 5: InfoGain Values for Different Features for Fully Simulated Networks
(darker color represents higher InfoGain)
Abnormality
Vertex
Probability
Probability
STDV
Probability
Median
Mean
Predicted
Link
Label
Sum Link
Label
Edge
Count
Predicted
Label
STDV
Arxiv 0.18 0.216 0.092 0 0 0.021 0
DBLP 0.165 0.082 0.146 0.148 0.124 0.036 0.072
Yelp 0.187 0.223 0.105 0 0 0.027 0
Mean 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
STDV 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.04
8 Conclusions
The ability to detect anomalies has become increasingly important in under-
standing complex networks. We present a novel generic method for detecting
anomalous vertices based on features extracted from the network topology. Our
method combines cutting-edge techniques in link prediction, graph theory, and
machine learning.
We evaluated our anomaly detection method on ten networks that can be cat-
egorized into three scenarios - fully simulated, semi-simulated, and real world
networks The evaluation results demonstrate that our anomaly detection model
performed very well, particularly in terms of AUC measure. We demonstrated
that in a real-life friendship graph, we can detect people who have the strongest
friendship ties. Moreover, we showed that our algorithm can be utilized to de-
tect malicious users on Twitter. We also showed that our method of detecting
anomalous vertices outperforms other anomaly detection methods. There is
considerable potential in using the presented method for a wide range of ap-
plications, particularly in the cyber-security domain. As for future directions,
we plan to apply the algorithm to other types of networks, such as bipartite
and weighted graphs. Much can be revealed by investigating the behavior of
anomalous vertices in complex networks.
9 Availability
This study is reproducible research. Therefore, the anonymous versions of the
social network datasets and the study’s code, including implementation, are
available on the project’s website17 and repository.18
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Figure 3: Class network, where the red vertices represent the anomalous vertices
(the boys who are the most central individuals in the friendship network), and
the red edges are the edges that have the lowest probabilities of being fake. The
graph demonstrates that almost all the red edges connected to the red vertices.
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